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 Since Card and Krueger (1994), the near-universal consensus among economists that 
minimum wages have disemployment effects has been lost. Additional empirical research has 
come to support the position that such policies have no disemployment effects (e.g., Dube et al. 
2010, and Basker and Khan 2016, c.f. Neumark and Wascher 2008). Those opposing the policy 
largely appeal to supply and demand (e.g., Mankiw 2014), while theoretically squaring the 
empirical result requires quite sophisticated rationales (e.g., Flinn 2006). Lee (2004) has, to the 
contrary, argued that the correct interpretation of such a result is that it still hurts workers by 
reducing fringe benefits or by providing worse working conditions. 
 However, another interpretation of the result has not been widely discussed. 
Inframarginal firms receive rents (producer surplus) from the sale of their goods and services. 
All firms receive quasi-rents as well. Quasi-rents are cash flows which serve as payments to 
fixed factors of production. Firms do not need to receive rents for their production to persist in 
the long run. Quasi-rents are unnecessary in the short run, but the firm will shut down in the long 
run in their absence. Klein et al. (1978) noted that labor, when organized, is capable of 
bargaining for not just the rent the business owner would earn under competitive conditions, but 
for the quasi-rents which would normally provide the market rate of return to the capital. In other 
words, unions are capable of pushing the firm to just above the shutdown condition and 
appropriate not only the full producer surplus, but the cost of capital as well. Despite this, in the 
short run, there are no disemployment effects. Organized labor thereby theoretically can 
disincentivize investment under the threat of quasi-rent appropriation. 
 Card et al. (2014), summarizing and extending the empirical evidence on quasi-rents and 
the more general rent-sharing, argue that unions are not this myopic. The authors find that, at 
least in the case of the Veneto region of Italy, workers bargain for rents, but only after the cost of 
capital has been deducted. Either bargaining or not bargaining for quasi-rents may be rational 
depending on discount rates. For a rational union with a long time horizon, hoping to secure long 
run fruitful employment for its members, this makes sense, though perhaps it lacks this incentive 
in a one period model. 
 How this relates to the minimum wage follows. Labor unions are theoretically capable of 
appropriating quasi-rents, but it appears that in at least some cases they are wise enough not to do 
so. Under such circumstances, there are no disincentives to investment. A labor union which 
bargains perfectly forces rent-sharing without having other deleterious effects on the firm. 
However, a minimum wage may also transfer the quasi-rent from the firm to labor. The hope of 
minimum wage proponents is to transfer the rent from the firm to labor, but this policy 
instrument does not discriminate between rents and quasi-rents. When this occurs, each of the 
stylized facts of the aforementioned empirical studies holds: unchanged employment, higher 
wages, and lower profits. There may yet be a small disemployment effect due solely to the 
marginal firms, though this effect is plausibly within the error term of most such empirical 
studies. For most firms, there are no disemployment effects in the short run. On the other hand, 
this verbal model is highly stylized, with firms locked into specific production techniques, an 
assumption that will not hold for all firms. 
 But the on-impact negative effects of minimum wages may be hidden. In the longer run, 
after the quasi-rent is dissipated, the owner would have the incentive to eventually switch from 
more labor-intensive methods to ones that are less globally efficient (this being the conventional 
“demand slopes down” result). More perniciously, the threat of future increases in the minimum 
wage may create regime uncertainty undermining a willingness to invest in the types of 
technology and capital complementary to low skilled labor, thereby reducing employment for 
low skilled workers. That is to say, the risk of the appropriation of quasi-rents can shift 
investment towards capital unlikely to be appropriated via the minimum wage. Repeated and 
arbitrary increases in the minimum wage worsen this risk. This is consistent with the recent shift 
towards long run effects of increases in the minimum wage, for instance Meer and West (2016).  
 Because quasi-rents are typically thought of narrowly (often as already grown 
agricultural products that will rot if a farm cannot hire labor to collect them; more generally it 
includes firm-specific capital machinery as well), here is a narrative to motivate the possibility of 
it being very relevant economically. A firm in the fast food industry must choose between a low 
labor intensity production technique and a high labor intensity production technique and 
purchase the relevant capital. The high labor intensity production technique is a set of traditional 
point of sale terminals each requiring an employee. The low labor intensity production technique 
is a set of self-serve terminals, requiring only a single employee supervising them 
simultaneously. Suppose that, at the market wage rate, the high labor intensity production 
technique is profit-maximizing and economically efficient. The firm invests in the high labor 
intensity capital not expecting a spike in the minimum wage. Should one occur, the firm has a 
choice to make among three options. The firm can recognize that sunk costs are sunk and 
continue operating, approximately as before. The point of sale terminals, organizational capital, 
location, and other fixed or quasi-fixed attributes of the business are analogous to the potentially 
rotting fruits in the field of a farm. The second is that it can shift the production technique and 
liquidate its capital. Or it can shut down. In the first instance, disemployment effects are modest, 
in the second they are large but perhaps on a lag, and in the third they are large and immediate. 
 It should also be noted that if the increases in minimum wage are anticipated, the firm 
would invest with that expectation and choose the low labor intensity production technique at the 
outset of investment, and this too would not appear in the contemporaneous data (or at least 
minimally in comparison to its actual effect on employment). Should such expectational effects 
be important empirically, considerable challenges to identification are present but unrecognized.  
 This discussion ultimately rests on a rather elementary recognition of the complexities of 
the short run, the long run, and the characteristics of shut down conditions. The point is that they 
are not really being discussed in the context of the debate. These considerations could explain the 
data as well as monopsony, matching, or bargaining theories. This results directly from the 
bluntness of a general minimum wage as a policy tool, whether it is enacted at the national, state, 
or local level. In countries where minimum wages are more carefully negotiated, or set with a 
very long time horizon, these effects may be less important. However, this explanation is simpler 
and more straightforward than many models making the same empirical predictions, although it 
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